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ORT reform and medical malpractice litigation are once again in
the news. Medical malpractice insurance premiums increase dra-
matically. Physicians complain. Insurers blame the tort system and
invoke the litany of rapidly escalating jury awards won by those grasping
for straws and rapacious plaintiffs' lawyers. National and local medical
associations call for reform, while physicians in high-risk specialties talk
about curtailing or even abandoning their practices.' Calls for "tort re-
form" become louder and more insistent as President George W. Bush
takes up the call for changes such as dollar caps on the amount of non-
economic damages that a jury may award.2 Across the nation, bills are
introduced at the federal and state level to impose limitations on medical
malpractice litigation. 3 Plaintiffs' lawyers, and some insurance industry
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1. See, e.g., Sheri Hall, Malpractice Rates Drive Off Doctors, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 25,
2004, at Al; American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, News Release, Medical
Liability Survey Reaffirms More Ob-Gyns Are Quitting Obstetrics (July 16, 2004), available
at www.Acog.orglfrom home/publications/press-releases/nr7-16-0 4.cfm (last visited Feb.
21, 2005); American Medical Association, Medical Liability Reform- Now! at 5-7 (2004),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/go/mlrnow (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). For a thought-
ful and concise discussion of the problem of medical malpractice, see David Studdert et al.,
Medical Malpractice, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 (2004).
2. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits; President Says 'Junk'
Litigation is Driving Small-Town Doctors Out of Business, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 6,
2005, at Al; Tanya Albert, Bush Stumping for Liability Reform in "Judicial Hellhole,"
AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 24, 2005), at http://www.ama-assn.orglamednews/2005/01/24/
gusbOl24.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
3. See, e.g., Tanya Albert, Doctors to Storm States for Tort Reform, AMEDNEws.COM
(Jan. 17, 2005), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/01/gvsaOll7.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005); Stephanie Francis Ward & Siobhan Morrissey, Tort Reform Gaining Trac-
tion: Lawyers Predict Election Success Will Spur Federal Efforts, ABA JOURNAL E-RE-
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critics have countered by blaming insurers for the crisis.4
Setting aside the question of who has the better side of the debate, it is
nonetheless clear that plaintiffs' attorneys are, and will remain, the focus
of much attention and considerable criticism. 5 They are, after all, the ones
who bring the lawsuits, and they are the ones who are perceived as ob-
taining the large settlements and the sometimes even larger jury awards.
What do we really know about these people? It is a topic where anecdote
and surmise dominate.6 Little empirical evidence exists that considers
what are the characteristics of successful (and not so successful) plaintiffs'
lawyers.
In this paper, we focus on the impact that the characteristics of plain-
tiffs' lawyers have on the outcome of medical malpractice cases. We ap-
proach our analysis from the perspective of the plaintiff and her counsel.
This perspective is an important one. Because of the nature of medical
malpractice litigation, there will be substantial gaps in what the plaintiff
and her lawyer know about the case. Unlike the defendant physician and
the defendant physician's insurer, plaintiffs do not have access to a wide
range of outside physician reviewers and experts. This asymmetry of in-
formation 7 is critical because the focus in most medical malpractice cases
PORT (Nov. 5, 2004), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/nov5tort.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2005). Several states, including Florida, Idaho, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Texas, and West Virginia, enacted legislation in 2003 and 2004 aimed at reforming medical
malpractice litigation. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Backgrounder: Medial
Malpractice (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2004/back
groundermedmal.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2005). In early 2005, Missouri, South Carolina,
Montana, and Virginia also enacted medical malpractice ligislation. Mike Norbut, Physi-
cians in Four States Score Tort Reform Wins, Amednews.com (Apr. 18, 2005), at
www.ameasson.org/adedraws/2005/04/18/gvsa.0418.htm. At the federal level, the House of
Representatives passed H.R. 4280, the Health Act, in May 2004. One of the key features of
the bill was the imposition of a cap on non-economic damages. The Senate, to date, has not
approved the bill. H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 54(c) (2d Sess. 2004), available at http://
www.thomas.loc.gov.
4. See, e.g., Americans for Insurance Reform, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Stable
Losses/Unstable Rates (Oct. 12, 2004), available at http://www.insurance-reform.org; J.
Robert Hunter and JoAnne Doroshow, Premium Deceit (1999), available at
www.centerjd.org/PremiumDeceit/%20.pdf. See also Robert J. Bingle, Reform Insurance
Industry, Not Legal System, CHIc. TRIB., Jan. 29, 2003 at 16 (letter to the editor from the
President of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association); Bob Herbert, Malpractice Myths, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2004 (op-ed.); Rachel Zimmerman and Christopher Oster, Assigning Lia-
bility: Insurers' Missteps Helped Provoke Malpractice 'Crisis', WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002, at
Al.
5. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUA-
"ON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADDRESSING THE NEW
HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 15 (2003); Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary
Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs' Bar in the Twenty-
First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 219, 220 (2001); Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: the Place
of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 1157, 1158 (1995).
6. See David Hyman, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System: What Do We Know
and What (If Anything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1639, 1639-40 (2002).
7. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments:
Is the Compensation Fair? 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 997, 1001 (1990).
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is breach of the standard of care, a subject usually left to experts. 8 Thus,
while defendant physicians and their insurers may be able to predict out-
come in terms of liability early on in the litigation, the same is often not
true for plaintiffs and their lawyers.
Lawyers believe that the identity of counsel makes a difference in
terms of case outcomes. Reflexively, lawyers believe that it is important
for a client to be represented by a "good" lawyer, not just a "competent"
lawyer. In other words, it matters who the plaintiff's lawyer is, and who
the defendant's lawyer is. Presumably, most clients also believe so. The
proposition is not self-evident, however. Do the lawyers really matter?
This is a threshold issue that must be addressed.
Earlier studies of medical malpractice litigation imply that the identity
of the lawyers involved does not really matter. Instead, much of the liter-
ature suggests that it is the apparent negligence of the defendant physi-
cian that predicts outcome. For example, a 1992 study of New Jersey
medical malpractice claims concluded that compensation for such claims
is closely associated with a finding of probable liability on the part of the
defendant physician, as determined by peer review-with no input from
counsel. 9 Similarly, other studies in Florida 10 and Chicago" found a sim-
ple connection between negligence, as determined by other physicians,
and compensation to the claimant. Likewise, a national study of anesthe-
siology claims found a strong link between negligence, as determined by
physician reviewers, and compensation.' 2 The implication of these studies
is that the central event in a rational system of claims resolution should
be a determination of medical fault by a panel of experts, based upon a
review of the relevant medical records. 13 The role of lawyers in such a
system would not be of great importance, particularly if a schedule of
compensation for specified injuries were to be adopted.
Other researchers have concluded that "fault" is not nearly as signifi-
cant as severity of injury. For example, a study conducted in the late
1980s in the State of New York found that whether any compensation at
all was paid to the claimant was tied to severity of injury, defined in terms
of temporary or permanent disability. 14 Whether the treating physician
had been negligent, however, was not linked to compensation.' 5 This
finding-a follow-up study to the larger and widely known Harvard Med-
8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 242, 639 (2000); PAUL C. WEILER, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 19 (1991). See also Sara Rosenbaum, The Impact of United
States Law on Medicine as a Profession, 289 JAMA 1546, 1551 (2003).
9. Mark Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780 (1992).
10. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 7, at 1014.
11. Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dis-
pute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 798 (1994).
12. Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA
1599, 1601 (1989).
13. Taragin et al., supra note 9, at 783.
14. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Out-




ical Practice Study16-has been frequently cited in the recent debate over
the need for tort reform. 17 Again, if severity of injury is the crucial varia-
ble, the role of lawyers would be peripheral, at best.
Even if compensation is tied to the determination of negligence, how-
ever, this finding has some obvious limitations as a useful predictor of
outcomes. First, the studies uniformly assume that it is the liability deter-
mination of the defendant's insurer that matters, not the assessment of
the plaintiff's counsel.18 After all, it is the insurer who ultimately writes
the check. Even the assessment by the defendant's counsel is likely to be
a function of the insurer's own determination.' 9 Thus, for all but the in-
surer (and perhaps the defendant's counsel), the assessment of liability
will not be known and will certainly not be discoverable by the plaintiff's
counsel. The insurer's assessment of liability may be a reliable predictor
of whether money is paid (either in settlement or following a plaintiff's
verdict), but from the plaintiff's perspective-from the perspective of the
person who decides whether to sue, in other words-it is not a useful
forecasting tool.20 Second, factors other than a conclusion of medical neg-
ligence can affect case outcomes. The decision whether to settle is made
against the predicted outcome at trial.21 Outcomes at trial can be affected
by the appearance and credibility of witnesses, as well as the trial skills of
opposing counsel. These are factors not related to determinations of neg-
ligence and causation. Because of these limitations, we set out to deter-
mine whether predictions of case outcomes can be made independently
of liability assessment. Specifically, we wanted to see if the identity of the
16. The Harvard Medical Practice Study was a population-based study of adverse
events in hospitalized patients. The study produced several books and numerous articles.
See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 8; PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993); Ken-
neth Abraham & Paul Weiler, Enterprise Liability for Health Care, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381(1994); Troyen Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370(1991); Brennan et al., supra note 14; Lucian Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in
Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 377 (1991).
17. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, supra note 5, at 8 n.45 (2003);
Yank Coble, Tragedy and Torts: Bankrupting Medicine Not the Answer, AM. MED. NEWS,
March 17, 2003 (opinion column by Dr. Coble, the President of the AMA); Hyman, supra
note 6, at 1643; Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to U.S. Reform, 24
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 27, 36 (1999); Michelle Mello & Troyen Brennan, Deterrence
of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595,
1619 (2002).
18. Cheney et al., supra note 12, at 1599; Taragin et al., supra note 9, at 780.
19. For a description of the claims resolution process from the insurer's perspective,
see Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: The Role of
Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 880, 885 (2002).
20. See Weiler, supra note 5, at 1162. It is often difficult for plaintiffs and their counsel
to tell if the injury in question was the result of medical malpractice.
21. See Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996); Herbert Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Law-
yers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement Realities, and Issues of Control in
the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 795, 801 (1998).
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plaintiff's attorney predicts case outcomes. In addition, we wanted to see
if severity of injury, by itself, is a reliable predictor of case outcomes.
Assuming that the identity of plaintiff's counsel does make a differ-
ence, an additional problem awaits. How can the effectiveness of the
plaintiff's counsel be measured? What do skilled plaintiffs' lawyers look
like? Research on the effect that the skill and competence of lawyers
have on case outcomes is very limited. As Professors Heinz and Laumann
observed twenty five years ago, the profession of law is less studied and
less understood than the practice of medicine.22 While scholars have de-
voted more attention to the nature of the practice of law since that time,
23
there is still much that we do not know about the profession. For exam-
ple, while studies by sociologists and others address such issues as profes-
sional stratification 24 and specialization,25 the relative importance of
competence and skill in predicting case outcomes has rarely been
considered. 26
The lack of serious study of the effect of legal competence and skill is
not surprising. Measuring competence and skill is difficult, as is the task
of determining actual case outcomes with precision.2 7 The evidence that
exists on the subject suggests that case evaluation and negotiation skills
make a difference in case outcomes,28 as does specialization. 29 In the con-
text of medical malpractice, a landmark study of obstetrical and emer-
gency room malpractice claims in Florida led by Professor Frank Sloan
suggested that the skill of the lawyer for the plaintiff might be a factor in
22. John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Pro-
fessional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (1978).
23. For a representative summary of scholarly examination of the legal profession, see
HERBERT KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 4, 6
(1990).
24. See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1994); H. LAURENCE
Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 74 (1970); Richard L. Abel, The Transformation of the
American Legal Profession, 20 LAW & Soc'y REV. 7, 12-13 (1986); Kritzer, supra note 5, at
220-23; Jack Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal Institutions, 27 AM.
Soc. REV. 47, 53 (1963); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Work and Honor in the Law: Prestige and
the Division of Lawyers' Labor, 66 AM. Socio. REV. 382, 382-83 (2001).
25. See, e.g., JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETIcs 11-13 (1966); DOUGLAS E. ROSEN-
THAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 134 (1977); Ross, supra note 24, at 73-
76; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times:
The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1785-95 (2002);
John. P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995,
32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 751, 760-61 (1998); Edward 0. Laumann et al., Washington Lawyers
and Others: The Structure of Washington Representation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 465, 488-89
(1985).
26. But see Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Stra-
tegic Advantage in Medical Malpractice Claims, AM. BAR FOUND. WORKING PAPER #9210
(1993).
27. For a discussion of the difficulties involved, and a description of possible methods
of evaluation, see Douglas E. Rosenthal, Evaluating The Competence of Lawyers, 11 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 257 (1976). See also the discussion of evaluation methods based on out-
comes in KRITZER, supra note 23, at 135-57.
28. HERBERT KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL 54-55 (1991); GERALD R. WILLIAMS,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 5-7 (1983).
29. ROSENTHAL, supra note 25, at 134.
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determining the outcome of specific cases. 30 The researchers found that
claimants represented by "specialist" attorneys fared better than did
claimants represented by non-specialist attorneys, in terms of amount re-
covered. 31 The researchers further observed that the relative importance
of who the lawyers are in a particular case had never been the subject of
empirical study.32 The measurement of the impact of specialist attorneys
on case outcomes introduced an important new dimension to an under-
standing of the litigation process. However, the impact of specialist attor-
neys was not the principal focus of the study. The study used a number of
different criteria, both objective and subjective, for determining specialist
status.33 The impact of specific attorney attributes other than "specialist"
status was not studied. In addition, the study considered only the influ-
ence of the plaintiff's counsel on case outcomes. The effect of the plain-
tiff's counsel's interaction with the defendant's counsel was not discussed.
As sparse as the literature is on the subject of lawyer skill and compe-
tence, there is even less discussion to be found on the consequences of
confrontation between lawyers with different levels of skill and compe-
tence. This lack of study is unfortunate since lawyers do not try or settle
cases in isolation. The identity of opposing counsel, in other words, might
matter as well.
Our study begins, then, with two related queries: (1) Can the outcome
of medical malpractice cases be predicted, without reference to assess-
ments of liability, by focusing on the competence and skill of the lawyer
for the plaintiff?; and (2) What measure can be used for determining
competence and skill? The answers to these two queries will lead to a
better understanding of the attributes of successful plaintiff's lawyers.
II. METHODS
A. THE SAMPLE
As is true for virtually all empirical studies of medical malpractice, our
data are drawn from a single state. We believe our findings can be readily
generalized beyond the borders of North Carolina. Our data reflect the
individual determinations as to payment (or non-payment) of claims by a
number of private medical malpractice insurers, many of whom do busi-
ness in more than one state. The insurers represent a blend of both physi-
cian-owned and investor-owned liability companies. North Carolina is a
demographically diverse state and is the tenth most populous state in the
30. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 154, 170, 181-82
(1993).
31. Id. at 196.
32. Id. at 164.
33. Specialists were defined to include attorneys who had handled four or more medi-
cal malpractice cases, whether in or out of the sample, as well as their partners and associ-
ate attorneys; lawyers listed as experts in tort law in The Best Lawyers in America,
members of the Inner Circle of Advocates; and attorneys who identified themselves as
medical malpractice specialists in the Martindale-Hubbell National Directory of Lawyers.
SLOAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 170.
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Union. There is nothing about North Carolina medical malpractice law
that places it outside the mainstream.
Our study is based on the collected data from 348 medical malpractice
lawsuits filed in the North Carolina courts between 1992 and 1995. Infor-
mation about these cases was obtained through a combination of tech-
niques. First, the actual court file for each case was retrieved, read, and
summarized. As a result, for each case we were able to determine the
nature of the plaintiff's claim, the severity of the alleged injury, and the
identity of the lawyers for the plaintiff and the defendant. From the court
files we were also able to determine the final disposition of each case,
such as whether the case went to trial, or was simply dismissed.
However, court records have their limitations. They rarely indicate
whether a monetary settlement was reached, and they almost never dis-
close the actual amount of any settlement. Instead, court records will in-
dicate either that a case was voluntarily dismissed-either with or without
prejudice-or that judgment was entered in favor of the defendant or the
plaintiff, usually following a jury trial. These are serious shortcomings,
since most civil cases, including malpractice cases, settle before trial.34 To
address these shortcomings, we surveyed and interviewed attorneys in-
volved in each case, in order to determine whether money was paid to the
plaintiff and, if so, how much. By comparing and matching data gathered
from the court records and from attorney interviews, we were able to
determine the "real" outcomes for the cases in the sample. In most cases
(296 out of 348 cases or 85.1% of cases), if money had actually been paid
to the plaintiff and whether the payment was made as part of a settlement
or as the result of a favorable verdict. We also collected basic demo-
graphic information for each attorney, including: city of practice, number
of years admitted to practice, law school attended, and gender. Although
we had 322 usable cases, totals for each analysis will vary since each vari-
able in our analysis had some missing values. 35
The selection of cases studied was not random. Our sample consisted of
cases that were ordered to mediation by the trial court under the auspices
of what was at the time a pilot program of mediated settlement confer-
ences mandated by the North Carolina General Assembly.36 In all, eigh-
teen counties were included in the pilot study. The pilot counties included
34. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 42 (1985); Patricia M.
Danzon and Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malprac-
tice Claims, 12 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 345, 347-48 (1983); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most
Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339,
1339-40 (1994); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 7, at 1005; Gross & Syverud, supra note 21, at 2.
35. Missing values occur in any study when information is unavailable for some cases
in a given analysis. When this occurs these cases are excluded from the analysis.
36. Sess. Laws 207 (N.C. 1991) (codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38 (1991) (repealed
1995)). In 1991, the General Assembly instructed the Administrative Office of the Courts
to implement a program of mandatory mediated settlement conferences in selected coun-
ties around the state. The program became statewide as of 1995. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-38.1 (Supp. 2004). For general background on the North Carolina program, see
Comment, Good Faith Mediation: Improving Efficiency, Cost, and Satisfaction in North
Carolina's Pre-trial Process, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 281 (1996); Comment, An End to Settle-
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five of the six most populous cities in the state (Charlotte, Raleigh,
Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and High Point). Because the sample con-
sisted of cases that had advanced far enough in the litigation process to be
ordered to mediation, 37 the sample is probably weighted in favor of dura-
ble cases, that is, cases that have progressed beyond the initial stages of
complaint and answer. It is likely that the sample excludes many, if not
most, frivolous cases.
B. THE MEASURE OF EFFECTIVE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL
We collected data on three general types of case outcomes: abandoned
cases, trials, and settlements. While other outcomes are possible,38 these
three outcomes account for the vast majority of the cases in our sample
(see Table 1, Outcomes). These three outcomes are all relevant to a de-
termination of the effectiveness of the plaintiff's counsel, but each has its
drawbacks as a measure of effectiveness. Abandoned cases-i.e., cases
unilaterally dropped by the plaintiff-are relevant because they represent
cases in which the plaintiff's counsel failed to obtain money for his or her
client, for whatever reason. Obviously, though, such cases tell us little
about the conditions that lead to the payment of money.39 The number or
rate of trials can be misleading simply because trials are quite uncommon
in medical malpractice litigation.40 Furthermore, an examination of cases
that actually make it to trial yields a skewed and unrepresentative pic-
ture, since it does not take into account the "selection effect" of settle-
ment.41 Settlement is a more common event too frequent to be ignored.
Yet settlement rate, by itself, can be misleading because it ignores the
impact of an occasional trial. In addition, reliance on court records as
evidence of settlement is sometimes misplaced. While a voluntary dismis-
sal with prejudice notation in the court file often indicates a monetary
settlement, this is not always the case. For example, a plaintiff's attorney
who has decided not to pursue a filed lawsuit might agree to file a volun-
tary dismissal with prejudice in exchange for a promise from the defense
counsel not to seek reimbursement of costs. Such an arrangement is more
ment on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated Settlement Conference in North Carolina Superior
Courts, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1857 (1993).
37. MEDIATED SETrLEMENT CONF. RULE 1B.(2) states that the Senior Resident Supe-
rior Court Judge is to issue the order for the mediated settlement conference "as soon as
practicable after the time for the filing of answers has expired." Thus, in order for a case to
be ordered to mediation, at least a complaint and answer will have been filed.
38. For example, summary judgment and dismissal by court order for failure to prose-
cute the claim.
39. The usual sign of an abandoned case is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
While it is true that a case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice may be later refiled,
after tracking all voluntary dismissals without prejudice for at least one year, we found that
most such cases were not refiled.
40. See Table 1. See also DANZON, supra note 34, at 42; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 30,
at 165-67; Farber & White, supra note 11, at 799-802; Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Medi-
cal Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROas. 43, 49
(1991).
41. Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
119, 137-38 (2002).
[Vol. 58
Who Are Those Guys?
in the nature of a negotiated surrender, than a true bargained-for settle-
ment. As a result, we focused our attention on a single measure: whether
money was paid to the plaintiff either in settlement or as the result of a
verdict following trial.
The reason for the decision to measure plaintiffs' lawyers' skill in terms
of whether money was paid to the plaintiff was simple. Our analysis looks
primarily at plaintiffs' attorneys, and plaintiffs' attorneys are compen-
sated only when money is obtained for their clients. The fact that money
was obtained in a given case thus takes on tremendous importance. While
a very competent plaintiff's lawyer might end up taking (and trying) her
case to verdict, the decision to proceed to trial will not be made lightly.
Defendant physicians win at trial much more often than plaintiff patients
do,42 and plaintiffs' lawyers are aware of that fact. Nonetheless, some-
times plaintiffs do win at trial. In recognition of that possibility, it was
important to include verdicts for the plaintiff in our measure of attorney
effectiveness. Our assumption is, then, that more effective plaintiffs' law-
yers obtain money for their clients more often than less effective plain-
tiffs' lawyers do. In short, what matters is money.
Other more sophisticated measures of effectiveness can be devised. For
example, it would be useful to compare settlement amounts, while con-
trolling for severity of the injury alleged. In our sample, however, we
found that while it was usually possible to determine whether money was
paid, it was not always possible to determine the actual amount paid. A
common condition of settlement is a pledge extracted from the plaintiff
not to disclose the settlement amount. Although we were able to obtain
actual settlement amounts for some cases, an insufficient number of such
cases precluded a detailed analysis of the results.
C. VARIABLES EXAMINED
We examined a number of different variables in order to determine: (1)
Whether the identity of the plaintiff's attorney matters?; and (2) If so,
what attributes of successful plaintiffs' attorneys make a difference? We
considered the impact of both single variables and combination variables
on payment and trial rates. Combination variables included (1) character-
istics of attorneys and (2) case attributes. The variables are described be-
low and summarized in Figure 1.
Severity of Injury
Some cases involve very serious injuries while others involve less signif-
icant harm. It is possible that the dynamics of resolution for cases involv-
ing a very severe injury will differ from those cases involving only a
modest or temporary injury. Indeed, some researchers have found that
severity of injury does affect settlement rates.43 We identified nine differ-
ent levels of severity of injury ranging from emotional injury to death,
42. Farber & White, supra note 11, at 802; Metzloff, supra note 40, at 50; Peeples et al.,
supra note 19, at 890-91.
43. See generally, Brennan et al., supra note 14.
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based on the nine-stage scale used by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners.44 For each case we determined the severity of the
alleged injury based on the contents of the complaint. We then created
two separate, binary variables. 45 The first variable used the categories
more severe, coded as "1" and less severe, coded as "0." The second vari-
able used the categories "death," coded as "1" and all other injuries,
coded as "0."
Hospital Defendant
Malpractice lawsuits sometimes name a hospital as a defendant either
alone or as one of several defendants. The presence of a hospital as a
defendant might affect the likelihood of money being paid to the plaintiff.
For example, an institution such as a hospital might not be perceived as a
sympathetic defendant at trial, especially when compared to individual
physician defendants. In addition, unlike physicians, hospitals are not
subject to the mandatory reporting requirements of the National Practi-
tioner Data Bank.46 Therefore, the incentive to avoid making any pay-
ment in settlement, no matter how modest, in order to stay out of the
Data Bank does not exist for hospitals. We created a binary variable to
identify cases in which a hospital was a defendant, coded as "1" for cases
in which a hospital was a defendant or a codefendant, and coded as "0"
for cases in which a hospital was not a defendant or codefendant.
Gender
The gender classification for plaintiffs' lawyers was, of course, straight-
forward. We created a binary variable with "male" coded as "1" and "fe-
male" coded as "0," in order to see if the gender of plaintiffs' lawyers had
any impact on case outcome.
Law School Attended
The categories used for law school attended consisted of the five law
schools located in North Carolina (UNC, Wake Forest, Duke, Campbell
and North Carolina Central) and a separate category for "out of state"
law schools. Because medical malpractice law, like personal injury law in
general, is a function of state rather than federal law, we wanted to see if
attending a law school in or outside of the state of North Carolina made
any difference. Recognizing that personal and professional relationships
are often made in law school we also wanted to look for evidence of
44. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, NAIC MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS: 1975-78 (1980), reproduced in Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 7, at 1004. The NAIC
scale is widely used as a standard measure for severity of injury. See, e.g., SLOAN ET AL.,
supra note 30, at 22-23.
45. A binary variable simply consists of a variable with only two categories, such as "0/
1" or "yes/no."
46. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (1994). The Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank was established by Congress in title IV, section 421 of the
Public Law 99-660. Under the Act, any amount paid by an insurer on behalf of a physician
must be reported to the Data Bank. Whether liability was established is irrelevant. For a
description of the National Practitioner Data Bank see Ilene D. Johnson, Reports to the
National Practitioner Data Bank, 265 JAMA 407 (1991); Elisabeth Ryzen, The National
Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEG. MED. 409 (1992).
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"networking." We created a binary variable with "in-state law school"
coded as "1" and "out of state law school" coded as "0." In addition,
when an attorney attended an in-state law school, we identified the par-
ticular school attended.
General Experience of the Plaintiffs Counsel
Experience is widely thought to be a desirable trait in a lawyer. To test
this assumption, we measured the general experience of the plaintiffs'
counsel against actual case outcomes. Attorney directories provide infor-
mation on the year attorneys were first admitted to practice. Using this
data we determined the number of years each attorney had been in prac-
tice, thus giving a measure of general practice experience. We also devel-
oped a binary variable. "0" was used to represent "younger" lawyers
with less than ten years from first admission to practice at the time of the
study. Ten or more years in practice was defined as "older" and coded as
"1." The distinction was based on the greatest length of time it might take
for a newly licensed attorney to be considered for partnership in his or
her law firm. That is, within ten years out of law school, an attorney has
had time to prove or not prove himself. We also created a similar binary
variable for defense counsel with the same criteria and coding.
Specific Experience in Medical Malpractice Litigation
Apart from general practice experience, the level of specific experience
in handling medical malpractice cases may also be associated with specific
case outcomes. After all, medical malpractice litigation is largely a spe-
cialty practice for lawyers, especially on the defense side. We noted rela-
tively few defense attorneys in our sample with a high concentration of
cases handled by a small number of attorneys. For example, less than
twenty percent of the defense lawyers in our sample (15 out of 89 lawyers
or 16.9%) accounted for more than half of the cases (188 out of 348 cases
or 54.0%). Less than ten percent of all defense lawyers (8 out of 89 law-
yers or 9%) accounted for almost forty percent of the cases (137 out of
348 cases or 39.4%). On the plaintiffs' side the number of cases handled
by a small number of attorneys is also striking, although the overall level
of concentration was not as great. About seven percent of all plaintiffs'
lawyers (12 out of 179 lawyers or 6.7%) accounted for more than thirty
percent of the cases (105 out of 348 cases or 30.2%). This suggests that
plaintiffs often make a conscious effort to seek out proven specialists. It is
also possible, of course, that attorneys who do not specialize in medical
malpractice will refer the client to an attorney with a reputation for han-
dling such cases. 47 Market principles also are at work. Medical malprac-
tice is a subset of personal injury law, an area of practice for which
plaintiffs' attorneys are invariably compensated on a contingent fee basis.
Only if the case yields a payment to the plaintiff does the plaintiff's coun-
sel collect a fee. It follows, then, that plaintiffs' attorneys who have han-
dled comparatively more medical malpractice cases have demonstrated
47. See, e.g., SLOAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 75-76; see generally Daniels & Martin,
supra note 25, at 1793-95.
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their skill in this field, to their own economic satisfaction, and perhaps to
the satisfaction of clients as well. However, it is important to keep in
mind that anyone with a willing client can be a plaintiff's lawyer.48 The
same is not true on the defense side where defense lawyers are retained
by the insurer.
We developed a binary variable of "1" for cases handled by attorneys
who had managed four or more cases during the study period labeled
''more case experience" and "0" for cases handled by attorneys who had
managed less than four cases labeled "less case experience." In effect,
this criterion required counsel to have handled on average at least one
medical malpractice case per year in order to be labeled as having more
case experience. 49 A mirror variable for defense counsel was also created,
using the same criteria and coding.
Trial Experience
While intuitively one would assume that trial experience would be an
important attribute for plaintiffs' lawyers to have, we wanted to test that
assumption. In order to measure trial experience, we created a binary
variable for trial experience. Cases handled by an attorney who had con-
ducted at least one medical malpractice trial during the study period were
coded as "1," trial experience. Cases handled by an attorney who had not
conducted a medical malpractice trial during the study period were coded
as "0," no trial experience.
Seasoned Attorneys
If we are to isolate the characteristics of the most successful plaintiffs'
counsel, we must consider their characteristics in combination to deter-
mine if there is an "additive effect." We defined "seasoned attorneys" as
those attorneys who (1) had handled at least four medical malpractice
cases; (2) had conducted at least one medical malpractice trial during the
study period; and (3) had attended law school within the state of North
Carolina. This determination was made for both plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' counsel. Cases handled by a "seasoned attorney" were coded as "1."
Cases not handled by a seasoned attorney were coded as "0."
High Percentage Cases
Case attributes can also be considered in combination. It may be, for
example, that when a case possesses two particular attributes, payment of
money becomes more likely. In order to examine this possibility, we de-
fined "high percentage cases" as those alleging a more severe injury and
in which a hospital is either a defendant or a co-defendant. Cases meeting
both criteria were coded as "1," high percentage cases. Cases not meeting
both criteria were coded as "0.''50
48. See Heinz et al., supra note 25, at 772.
49. This criterion is similar to one of the criteria used by Sloan et al. in their Florida
study. One of the standards used for identifying a plaintiffs' lawyer as a specialist was his or
her involvement in at least four cases. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 170.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45 for a discussion of the logic for this com-
bination of case attributes.
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A summary of all the variables examined is contained in Figure 1.
The Omitted Variable: Assessment of Liability
By design, our analysis does not include any measure of liability assess-
ment. We did not distinguish among cases in which either the plaintiff's
counsel, the defendant's counsel, or the insurer thought liability was ei-
ther likely, unlikely, or uncertain. While there is much evidence that indi-
cates that payment of money in a settlement is associated with a
determination of liability by the insurer, 51 this association has its own
drawbacks as a useful predictor of outcomes, as discussed above.52 Our
purpose instead was to see if predictions of case outcome can be made
independently of liability assessment. Specifically, we wanted to see if an
understanding of attorney attributes can predict case outcomes.
D. APPROACH TO ANALYSIS
Our analysis relies on descriptive statistics. Although the results of our
bivariate statistical analyses are reported in the tables, small numbers in
some cases make interpretation of results problematic. In these analyses,
our discussion focuses on differences in percentages.
III. FINDINGS
The attorneys in our sample were overwhelmingly male-88.8% of de-
fense counsel and 87.6% of plaintiffs' counsel. Most had attended law
school in the state of North Carolina (80.9% of plaintiffs' lawyers, 75% of
defense lawyers, and 78.8% overall). The attorneys had been in practice a
median of twenty years. Plaintiffs' lawyers were more numerous -than de-
fense lawyers, by a two to one margin (179 plaintiffs' lawyers and 89 de-
fendants' lawyers). This reflects the tendency of insurers to rely on a
relatively small group of attorneys to represent their insureds, as well as
the absence of any formal barriers to representing a plaintiff in a medical
malpractice lawsuit. The higher number of plaintiffs' lawyers meant that,
on average, defense counsel handled more cases (3.91) than did plaintiffs'
counsel (1.91).
Over sixty-nine percent of the cases involved more severe injuries, with
21.6% being death cases. In a substantial number of the cases (143 out of
348 cases or 40.1%), a hospital defendant was involved, either alone or as
a co-defendant.
As Table 1 shows, of the 348 cases in our total sample, settlements
53
were the most frequent outcome (51.5%), followed by abandoned cases.
There were fifty-eight trials, for a trial rate of 16.7%. Not every case that
51. Cheney et al., supra note 12; Peeples et al., supra note 19, at 893-94; Sloan &
Hsieh, supra note 7; Taragin et al., supra note 9.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
53. "Settlement" in this context does not necessarily mean a payment of money to the
plaintiff, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 40-41. A "settlement" instead means







Dependent Variable Definition Coding
Money Paid Cases in which money was 0 = money not paid
paid to the plaintiff, whether 1 = money paid
in settlement or as the result
of a favorable jury verdict
Independent Variables Definition Coding





General experience of plain-
tiff's lawyer Independent
Variables




Less severe injuries included
emotional only, insignificant
injury, minor temporary disa-
bility, and major temporary
disability
More severe injuries included
minor permanent partial disa-
bility, major permanent par-
tial disability, major
permanent total disability,
grave permanent total disabil-
ity and death
Did Patient Die?
Was at least one of the
defendants a hospital?
What was the gender of
plaintiff's lawyer?
Where did plaintiff's lawyer
attend law school?
Number of years since plain-
tiff's lawyer was admitted to
practice
Number of medical malprac-
tice cases handled by plain-
tiff's lawyer during the study
period
Number of medical malprac-
tice cases handled by defen-
dant's lawyer during the
study period
Did plaintiff's lawyer conduct
at least one trial during the
study period?
Did plaintiff's lawyer (1) han-
dle at least four medical mal-
practice cases, (2) conduct at
least one trial, and (3) attend
an in-state law school?
Did defendant's lawyer (1)
handle at least four medical
malpractice cases, (2) conduct
a least one trial, and (3)
attend an in-state law school?
0 = less severe
1 = more severe
0 = patient did not die





0 = out of state
1 = in the state of North
Carolina
0 = less than 10 years
1 = more than 10 years
0 = less than four cases
1 = four or more cases
0 = less than four cases
1 = four or more cases
0 = no
1 = yes
0 = no, as to 1,2, or 3
1 = yes, as to 1, 2, and 3
0 = no, as to 1, 2, or3
1 = yes, as to 1, 2, and 3
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TABLE 1
OUTCOMES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
Number Pct
Abandoned Cases 77 22.1%
Involuntary Dismissals summary judgment, court order
dismissing complaint 16 4.6%
Judgment following trial 45 13.2%
Settlement 178 51.1%
Other (outcome unknown or unclear) 31 8.9%
Total 348 99.9%
went to trial ended in a judgment. Some cases settled after the trial
started, and several cases were dropped after the trial started. Of the
forty-eight cases that progressed as far as a jury verdict, plaintiffs won ten
(20.8%) and defendants won thirty-eight (79.2%). 54 Money was paid to
the plaintiff (through settlement or verdict) in slightly more than half
(50.7%) of the cases. We report payment and trial rates for each variable.
A. CASE A'rRIBu'TES: SEVERITY OF INJURY AND
HOSPITAL DEFENDANTS
As Table 2 shows, money was more likely to be paid in settlement for
cases in which serious injury was alleged (53.6% compared to 44.0%). In
addition, the trial rate was somewhat higher for such cases (20.4% com-
pared to 14.3%), although plaintiff's success rate at trial was only slightly
higher (21.6% compared to 18.2%). Cases involving death were even
more likely to result in the payment of money: over two-thirds of such
cases (68.2%) ended with money being paid to the plaintiff. This result is
statistically significant (p< 0.001, phi= -0.188).55 Death cases resulted in
trial less often than other cases. Success rates at trial for death and non-
death cases were similar at 20% and 21.1%, respectively.
When a hospital was a defendant-either alone or as a codefendant-
the likelihood of a monetary payment increased (see Table 2). Money was
paid in hospital cases more than half the time (55.9%). In non-hospital
cases, money was paid less than half the time (46.7%). Although trial
rates for hospital and non-hospital cases were about the same (16.4% ver-
54. Judgment was actually entered in only forty-six of the cases. In the two other cases,
despite a jury verdict, a settlement was reached.
55. Measures of association are reported in the Tables. In the words of a leading text:
The statistical significance of a relationship observed in a set of sample data
... is always expressed in terms of probabilities. "Significant at the .05 level
(p< .05)" simply means that the probability that a relationship as strong as
the observed one can be attributed to sampling error alone is no more than 5
in 100. Put somewhat differently, if two variables are independent of one
another in the population, and if 100 probability samples are selected from
that population, no more than 5 of those samples should provide a relation-
ship as strong as the one that has been observed.




EFFECT OF CASE ATTRIBUTES ON PAYMENT AND
TRIAL RATES
Money Paid Plaintiff's Success
Variable to Plaintiff Trial Rate Rate at Trial
No. Total
Number Total Pct Trials cases Pct. Won Total Pct.
Severity of Injury
More severe 113 211 53.6% 45 221 20.4% 8 37 21.6%
Less severe 33 75 44.0% 13 91 14.3% 2 11 18.2%
Did Patient Die?
Yes 45 66 68.2% 11 71 15.5% 2 10 20.0%
No 105 230 45.7% 47 251 18.7% 8 38 21.1%
Was a Hospital a
Defendant?
Yes 71 127 55.9% 22 134 16.4% 6 19 31.6%
No 79 169 46.7% 36 188 19.1% 4 29 13.8%
sus 19.1%), the plaintiffs' success rates were not. Plaintiffs were more
than twice as likely to obtain a favorable verdict in hospital cases as they
were in non-hospital cases (31.6% versus 13.8%).
B. ATTORNEY ATTRIBuTEs: GENDER, LAW SCHOOL ATENDED,
GENERAL EXPERIENCE AND MALPRACTICE
CASE EXPERIENCE
Statistical analysis of gender differences is necessarily limited, due to
the small number of female attorneys in our sample. Nonetheless, as indi-
cated in Table 3, female plaintiffs' attorneys obtained money for their
clients more frequently than their male counterparts (57.6% versus.
49.8%). In addition, female plaintiffs' attorneys went to trial more often(25% compared to 17.6%) and were more frequently successful at trial,
winning 33.3% of the time compared to 19% for men (Table 3).
It made very little difference whether the plaintiff's attorney had at-
tended a law school in or out of the state of North Carolina, in terms of
obtaining money for clients (Table 3). However, attorneys educated out-
of-state tried cases less frequently (15.5% versus 19.6%), and prevailed at
trial less often than those who had attended a law school in North Caro-
lina (9.1% compared to 25.7%).
Neither payment rates nor trial rates were greatly affected by the gen-
eral experience level of plaintiffs' counsel, although younger lawyers
fared somewhat better than older lawyers in obtaining money at trial(20% compared to 12.9%) (Table 3). However, the story changes when
medical malpractice case experience is considered. Money was more
likely to be paid in cases in which plaintiffs' counsel had handled four or
more medical malpractice cases (57.1% compared to 46.3%). This result
approaches statistical significance (p=0.07). When favorable jury verdicts
are disregarded and only monetary settlements are considered, the result
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TABLE 3
EFFECT OF ATTORNEY ATTRIBUTES ON PAYMENT
AND TRIAL RATES
Plaintiff's Success
Variable Money Paid Trial Rate Rate at Trial
No. Total
Number Total Pct Trials cases Pct. Won Total Pct.
Gender
Male 128 257 49.8% 50 284 17.6% 8 42 19.0%
Female 19 33 57.6% 8 32 25.0% 2 6 33.3%
Law School attended
In-state 106 207 51.2% 44 224 19.6% 9 35 25.7%
Out-of-state 34 66 51.5% 11 71 15.5% 1 10 9.1%
Years in Practice-
Plaintiffs Counsel
Older 107 212 50.5% 37 228 16.2% 4 31 12.9%
Younger 28 53 52.8% 13 57 22.8% 2 10 20.0%
Medical Malpractice
Case Experience
More case experience 68 119 57.1% 25 127 19.7% 5 20 25.0%
Less case experience 82 177 46.3% 33 195 16.9% 5 28 17.8%
Trial experience
Yes 72 138 52.2% nla n/a
No 75 152 49.3% n/a n/a
becomes statistically significant (p< 0.05). Trial rates for plaintiffs' law-
yers with more medical malpractice experience were only slightly higher
(19.7% compared to 16.9%), but their success rate at trial was noticeably
higher (25% compared to 17.9%). Table 3 further indicates that whether
plaintiffs' counsel had trial experience had little effect, in and of itself, on
the frequency of payment. Plaintiffs' counsel with medical malpractice
trial experience were only slightly more likely to obtain compensation for
their clients (52.2% versus 49.3%).
Thus far only the impacts of single variables on payment and trial rates
have been considered. This approach is only the first step, however, if we
are to isolate the characteristics of the most successful plaintiffs' attor-
neys. Plaintiffs' lawyers, after all, have a number of attributes that can be
measured. When several variables are considered in combination, a
sharper picture emerges.
Table 4 shows the results when three attorney-specific attributes-med-
ical malpractice case experience, trial experience, and law school at-
tended-are considered in combination. Plaintiffs' counsel with both
substantial malpractice case experience and trial experience who had at-
tended one of the five in-state law schools did much better than plaintiffs'
lawyers who lacked one or more of these attributes. They obtained
money for their clients in almost three-fourths of their cases (72.7%) and
went to trial twice as often as other plaintiffs' lawyers. Both results are
statistically significant (p< 0.001 and p< 0.01, respectively). Furthermore,




PAYMENT AND TRIAL RATES: SEASONED ATTORNEYS
Success Rate
at Trial Money Paid Trial Rate
Pct. No. Total Pct. No. Total Won Total Pct.
Seasoned Attorneys 30.6*% 40 55 72.7**% 19 62 5 13 38.5%
Less Seasoned Attorneys 15.5% 100 218 45.9% 36 197 5 33 15.2%
* p < 0.01
** p < 0.001
The difference in outcomes goes beyond payment and trial rates, how-
ever. Seasoned plaintiffs' attorneys-that is, attorneys with medical mal-
practice case experience, trial experience, and a law degree from an in-
state law school-very seldom gave up on their cases. Only three out of a
total of sixty-two cases handled by seasoned attorneys were dropped uni-
laterally (4.8%) (see Table 5). The abandonment rate for other plaintiffs'
lawyers was much higher (69 out of 233 cases or 29.6%). In addition, an
adverse summary judgment or involuntary dismissal by court order never
happened in cases handled by seasoned attorneys.
TABLE 5
CASE OUTCOMES FOR PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS
Less-Seasoned More Seasoned
Plaintiffs' Lawyers Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Number Pct. Number Pct.
Abandoned Cases 69 29.6% 3 4.8%
Involuntary Dismissals
(summary judgment, court
order dismissing complaint) 13 5.6% 0 0.0%
Judgment following trial 32 13.7% 12 19.4%
Settlements 116 49.8% 46 74.2%
Other 3 1.3% 1 1.6%
Total 233 100.0% 62 100.0%
The picture can be made clearer still. The outcome of a contested case
cannot be described only in terms of the attributes of plaintiffs' counsel
or only in terms of defense counsel. After all, lawyers do not get to
choose opposing counsel. What happens when lawyers of disparate levels
of experience confront each other? When medical malpractice case and
trial experience and law school attributes are also applied to defense
counsel, the differences in payment and trial rates become even more
pronounced. The results are displayed in Table 6, which shows four possi-
ble combinations: (1) cases handled by plaintiffs' lawyers with trial and
malpractice case experience who had attended a law school in-state but
opposed by defense lawyers lacking one or more of these attributes; (2)
cases in which both the plaintiffs' lawyers and the defense lawyers had
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trial and case experience and had attended law school in-state; (3) cases
in which defense counsel had trial and case experience and had attended
law school in-state but was opposed by plaintiffs' lawyers who lacked one
or more of those attributes; and (4) cases in which neither plaintiff's law-




Money Paid Plaintiff's Success
to Plaintiff Trial Rate Rate at Trial
Number Total Pct. Number Total Pct. Won Total Pct.
Seasoned plaintiff's lawyer,
less seasoned defense
lawyer 20 25 80.0% 8 28 28.6% 2 4 50.0%
Seasoned plaintiff's lawyer,
seasoned defense lawyer 19 27 70.4% 8 31 25.8% 3 7 42.9%
Less seasoned plaintiff's
lawyer, seasoned defense
lawyer 46 116 39.7% 22 121 18.2% 2 20 10.0%
Less seasoned plaintiff's
lawyer, Less seasoned
defense lawyer 52 96 54.2% 13 106 12.3% 3 12 25.0%
A mismatch in favor of the plaintiff led to payment, either in settle-
ment or at trial eighty percent of the time. In contrast, a mismatch in
favor of the defendant led to payment, either in settlement or at trial, less
than forty percent (39.7%) of the time. This result is statistically signifi-
cant (p< 0.001). Of equal importance, however, is the fact that mis-
matches in the defendant's favor were much more common (116 cases)
than mismatches that favored the plaintiff (25 cases) by a margin of over
four to one. The difference in outcome by matches and mismatches is
statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
Trial rates were lowest (12.3%) when neither counsel had trial and case
experience and a law degree from an in-state law school. Success rates at
trial for plaintiffs' counsel were highest (50%) when a mismatch favored
the plaintiff and were lowest (10%) when a mismatch favored the defen-
dant. Abandonment rates were lowest when a mismatch favored the
plaintiff. Abandonment rates were highest when a mismatch favored the
defendant (38 abandonments out of 121 cases where mismatch favored
defendant or 31.4%).
Case attributes provide an additional insight. More seasoned plaintiffs'
counsel tended to handle only cases alleging more severe injuries (Table
7). The difference in selection of cases by severity between less seasoned





SEASONED ATTORNEYS AND CASE ATTRIBUTES
Less Seasoned More Seasoned
Variable Plaintiffs' Lawyers Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Number Total Pct. Number Total Pct.
Severity of Injury
More Severe 169 246 68.7% 56 64 87.5**%
Less Severe 77 246 31.3% 8 64 12.5%
Was a Hospital a Defendant?
Yes 98 253 38.7% 33 67 49.3%
No 155 253 61.3% 34 67 50.7%
** p < 0.01
In addition, more seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers were more likely to sue
hospitals-either alone, or as one of several named defendants. This last
observation takes on more importance when one last connection is made.
Hospitals were much more likely to be involved as defendants in cases
involving the patient's death (30.8% compared to 15.1%) (Table 8), and
death cases were much more likely to result in payment to the plaintiff
(see Table 2).
TABLE 8
HOSPITALS AND DEATH CASES
Did Patient Die?
Yes Pct. No Pct. Total
Was a Hospital a defendant?
Yes 44 30.8% 99 69.2% 143
No 31 15.1% 174 84.9% 205
p < 0.001
Case attributes can also be considered in combination. What happens,
for example, to cases alleging a serious injury and involving a hospital as
a defendant? Table 9 provides the results. When both a serious injury was
alleged and a hospital was a named defendant (high percentage cases),
payment of money to the plaintiff became much more likely-60.4% ver-
sus 45.9%. The difference is statistically significant (p< 0.05, phi= 0.136).
Such cases were, furthermore, significantly more likely to be handled by
seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers than by less seasoned lawyers (43.9% versus
28%), as Table 10 shows. This difference is significant at the 0.05 level,
phi= 0.140 (see Table 10).
IV. DISCUSSION
When considered in isolation, few factors were strongly linked to the
ultimate payment of money to the plaintiff. Only death cases and the case
experience of plaintiffs' counsel were reliable indicators of payment.
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TABLE 9
PAYMENT AND TRIAL RATES: SERIOUS INJURY CASES WITH
A HOSPITAL DEFENDANT
Money Paid Plaintiff's Success
to Plaintiff Trial Rate Rate at Trial
Number Total Pct. Number Total Pct. Won Total Pct.
Serious Injury Cases with
a Hospital Defendant 58 96 60.4*% 18 98 18.4% 5 15 33.3%
All Other Cases 90 196 45.9% 40 220 18.2% 5 33 15.2%
* p = 0.02
TABLE 10
CASE SELECTION: SEASONED ATTORNEYS AND
ATTRACTIVE CASES
Less-Seasoned More Seasoned
Plaintiffs' Lawyers Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Number Total Pct. Number Total Pct.
Serious Injury Cases with a Hospital
Defendant 70 250 28.0% 29 66 43.9* %
All Other Cases 180 250 72.0% 37 66 56.1%
* p < 0.02
More severe injuries and the presence of a hospital as a party defendant
increased the likelihood of payment, but not dramatically. The general
experience level of plaintiff's counsel and the law school attended by
plaintiff's counsel did not make much difference, nor did the trial experi-
ence or gender of plaintiff's counsel.
A. THE ATTRIBUTES OF SEASONED PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS
When attorney attributes are considered in combination, however, the
picture becomes clearer. Cases handled by seasoned attorneys-attorneys
who had handled at least four medical malpractice cases, who had con-
ducted at least one medical malpractice trial, and who had attended law
school in North Carolina-resulted in a payment to the plaintiff almost
three-fourths of the time. Cases handled by seasoned attorneys were
twice as likely to go to trial, and the odds of prevailing at trial, although
still less than fifty percent, were much better than the odds faced by
plaintiffs represented by less seasoned attorneys. In short, seasoned attor-
neys simply did better than their less seasoned counterparts, by several
measures.
Seasoned attorneys, then, represent the most successful category of
plaintiffs' lawyers. Why might this be so? A closer examination of the
three attributes of seasoned attorneys provides some answers.
The key attribute of seasoned attorneys is substantial medical malprac-
tice case experience. Plaintiffs' lawyers who had handled four or more
medical malpractice cases were much more likely to obtain money for
their clients than their less experienced counterparts. When jury verdicts
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for the plaintiff are excluded, and only settlements for money are consid-
ered, the difference in results is even more striking. Case experience
makes a difference. The positive effect of experience certainly comports
with common sense. Obtaining money in settlement of a disputed case is
largely a function of bargaining. Bargaining is a skill, and as such, one
would expect improvement as one gains experience. More specifically,
there is evidence that judgment accuracy improves with experience in
bargaining. 56 Judgment accuracy is of obvious value to a bargainer. In
order to be successful, one will be expected to assess the strengths and
weaknesses not only of one's own case, but also the strengths and weak-
nesses of the opponent's case. In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys must be
able to assess the attractiveness of any offer in settlement that the insurer
may make. These are decisions informed by experience. In making these
decisions, plaintiffs typically rely heavily on the advice of counsel.57 It
should therefore not be surprising that experience on the plaintiffs' coun-
sel side is associated with higher rates of payment. One either gets better
in obtaining payment for claims of medical malpractice, or one takes up a
different specialty. However, our data indicate that it is not enough to be
experienced in general. It is specific, medical malpractice case experience
that makes the difference.
In short, with case experience comes greater case picking expertise. Be-
cause of their case experience, seasoned attorneys are better equipped to
spot likely "winners." A review of Table 10 bears this conclusion out.
Seasoned attorneys rarely abandon their cases. They choose carefully,
and they do not second guess their choices.
Yet greater medical malpractice case experience alone does not ac-
count for the differences in performance by seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers.
Results further improve for plaintiffs when trial experience is factored
into the definition of "seasoned" attorney. The fact that seasoned attor-
neys went to trial more often, and succeeded at trial more often, suggests
that trial experience is quite valuable. The increased positive effect that
trial experience has on plaintiffs' outcomes suggests something else as
well. Reputation matters. The insurers' decisions about whether to settle
or defend medical malpractice cases are made against the backdrop of
trial prediction.58 The fact that the plaintiff's lawyer has trial experience
makes his or her professed willingness to go to trial in a given case more
believable, since he or she has done it before. The demonstrated willing-
ness to take cases to trial, thereby imposing additional costs and risks on
the insurer, serve to make the settlement demands of the plaintiff's coun-
sel more credible.59 After all, medical malpractice litigation is largely a
specialty practice,60 often characterized by repeat players in the form of
56. Leigh Thompson, The Influence of Experience on Negotiated Performance, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 528, 542 (1990).
57. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 63, 125.
58. Gross & Syverud, supra note 21; Peeples et al., supra note 19, at 887-88, 893-94.
59. CARLIN, supra note 24, at 78-79; ROSENTHAL, supra note 25, at 59.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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opposing counsel on both sides.61 Insurers and defense counsel will know
whether a particular plaintiffs' lawyer has a record of obtaining money in
settlement and a record of taking cases to trial. It may well be that the
defendants' bargaining posture is affected by that knowledge. 62 In other
words, success breeds success. It is the strong that survive.
The connection that in-state legal training has to plaintiffs' lawyers'
success is harder to generalize about, although its additive effect on out-
comes is clear. A high percentage of students who attend law school in
North Carolina stay in North Carolina.63 Attendance at an in-state law
school leads to relationships with fellow students who will also practice in
North Carolina. Connections are often formed and reputations are often
made while in law school. In other words, attendance at a law school in
state may be an early step in a networking process that facilitates cooper-
ation among lawyers. It is also true that many students attend law school
in North Carolina simply because they grew up in North Carolina. It may
be that a familiarity with the state-reinforced by attendance at an in-
state law school-reduces the risk of being perceived as an outsider, as
someone "not from around here" who must be treated with a measure of
suspicion.64 There may also be a benefit in sounding like a local, particu-
larly with juries.
B. MATCHES AND MISMATCHES
The contrast in case outcomes was starkest when mismatches oc-
curred-when a seasoned attorney was paired with a less seasoned advo-
cate. Very simply, plaintiffs did best when their lawyer was seasoned and
defense counsel was not. Defendants did best when their lawyer was sea-
soned and plaintiff's counsel was not. When a mismatch favored the
plaintiff, money was paid eighty percent of the time. When a mismatch
favored the defendant, money was paid less than forty percent of the
time. Success rates at trial followed a similar pattern. Therefore, it is not
only the identity of the plaintiff's lawyer that matters. The identity of op-
posing counsel makes a difference as well. Still, this observation needs to
be qualified. The reason for this becomes apparent when the numbers
behind the matches and mismatches are considered. It is an infrequent
event when a plaintiff's lawyer is opposed by a less seasoned defense law-
61. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 94, 124.
62. See CARLIN, supra note 24, at 78-79; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 99 (1974).
63. For example, in 1996 (the earliest year for which the data are available) a total of
770 law students received their law degree from the five North Carolina law schools. Of
that number, 413 applied to take the North Carolina bar exam that summer (53.6%). By
individual schools, the percentage of graduates taking the North Carolina bar exam ranged
from a high of 88.3% (Campbell) to a low of 12.8% (Duke). SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCA-
TION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (1998 ed.).
64. As part of our interviewing process with attorneys, we routinely asked about their
recollections of opposing counsel. When a lawyer wanted to question the relative skill of
opposing counsel, it would frequently be expressed in terms of being "not from around
here," or "he's not from around here and doesn't know."
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yer. The converse situation is much more common. Quite simply, plain-
tiffs and their lawyers do not get to choose their opposing counsel. The
insurer makes the decision about which lawyer to retain after the identity
of plaintiff's counsel is known. It would be surprising, indeed, if relatively
inexperienced defense lawyers were retained to oppose more battle-hard-
ened plaintiffs' lawyers.
What seems clear is that novice players play against long odds. One
pays a price to gain experience, in terms of less favorable outcomes or
less desirable cases. Mismatches favor the more seasoned counsel, and
the mismatches more frequently favor the defense side.
C. THE ROLE OF CASE ATrRIBUThS
When considered in combination, two case attributes-severity of in-
jury and hospital involvement-are quite predictive of payment. Specifi-
cally, cases alleging a more severe injury and naming a hospital as a party
defendant were much more likely to result in payment of money to the
plaintiff than cases lacking one or both of those attributes. Which is the
more important indicator of payment-case attributes or attorney
attributes?
A review of our findings leads to the conclusion that it is the attorney
attributes that are the critical indicators. The fact that cases alleging seri-
ous injury and those involving hospitals are handled disproportionately
by seasoned attorneys is the key.65 Attorneys pick cases, not vice versa.
Cases of more serious injury are more attractive than cases of less serious
injury since they can be expected to settle (or be tried) for more money
than cases of less serious injury. A similar dynamic may be at work for
cases involving hospitals. Suing a hospital presents several advantages for
a plaintiff's counsel. First, hospitals are institutions, not individuals. Their
potential for winning sympathy from a jury is likely to be much less than
the sympathy a defendant physician might attract. Second, unlike physi-
cians' policies, most hospital malpractice insurance policies come with
high deductibles. 66 Thus, hospitals bear more economic risk in insisting
on trial than physicians do. Third, unlike physicians, hospitals are not sub-
ject to the constraints imposed by the National Practitioner Data Bank.67
Money paid in settlement to a plaintiff by a hospital need not be reported
to the Data Bank. In contrast, any amount, regardless how modest, paid
on behalf of a physician must be reported. This built-in disincentive to
settle cases operates on physicians but not hospitals. The conclusion to be
drawn, however, is more basic. Attorney attributes are at least as impor-
tant as case attributes. The oft-cited point 68 that severity determines pay-
65. See Daniels et al., supra note 26, at 29.
66. Samuel Gross & Kent Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 319, 363 (1991).
67. See supra note 46.
68. Brennan et al., supra note 14. Brennan et al.'s finding that only severity of injury
predicted payment to claimants-as opposed to the apparent existence of negligence-has
been frequently cited. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16. This is somewhat puzzling for
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ment, then, is at least incomplete, if not misleading.
The system turns on an ability to pick cases shrewdly, and for that task,
seasoned attorneys are much better equipped. 69 When a potential case is
first brought to him or her, the plaintiffs' attorney must make a determi-
nation whether the case has potential monetary value. This determina-
tion, of course, is made necessary because of the way plaintiffs' attorneys
are compensated; plaintiffs' counsel agree to take cases in return for a
percentage of any moneys recovered. Whether a case has monetary value
depends on two factors: the perceived odds that liability can be estab-
lished and the likely amount of any recovery. Case experience helps the
plaintiffs' attorney evaluate these two factors.70 The fact that more sea-
soned plaintiffs' lawyers handled cases of greater severity more fre-
quently than other plaintiffs' lawyers is evidence of the value of greater
case experience. Over 87.5% of the cases handled by more seasoned
plaintiffs' lawyers involved allegations of more severe injuries, compared
to 68.7% of the cases handled by less seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers. 71 In
general, the monetary value of a case increases with the severity of the
injury. Therefore, seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers are more likely to select
cases in which injury is more severe. The much higher abandonment rate
for less seasoned plaintiffs' lawyers also suggests that seasoned attorneys
are more likely to pick cases in which payment will be made.
It also seems that success breeds success. Plaintiffs' lawyers who have
demonstrated an ability to recover money for their clients may expect to
be sought out by potential plaintiffs. The likelihood of referrals from non-
specialists also increases. Previous research provides evidence that poten-
tial plaintiffs do, in fact, tend to find the lawyers who have had success in
the past either on their own, or with the help of referring lawyers. 72 Our
research supports this view. A relatively small number of plaintiffs' law-
yers handled a relatively large number of the cases in our sample.73 Po-
tentially lucrative cases find the more successful plaintiffs' attorneys,
wherever they might be located. Counsel's geographic proximity to the
plaintiff does not seem to be very important.
several reasons. First, as Brennan and his co-authors subsequently observed in a later arti-
cle, their finding is at odds with what most other researchers have found. See David Stud-
dert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical Injury Burden, Malpractice
Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REv.
1643, 1654-65 (2000). Second, the finding was ultimately based on an examination of only
forty-six claims records-the end product, in a sense, of the much larger Harvard Medical
Practice Study, which was a population based study, not a claims-made study. Brennan et
al.'s findings were replicated in Utah and Colorado, but again the number of claims studied
was quite small (18).
69. Daniels et al., supra note 26, at 38-39.
70. Kritzer, supra note 21, at 800, 808.
71. p= 0.003.
72. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 73-76.




The very high rate of settlement for death cases is not particularly sur-
prising. It may be that insurers are not anxious to take death cases to
trial. It may also be that in death cases, the family of the deceased patient
tend to be more interested in a prompt resolution to the case and are
particularly disinclined to relive the circumstances of the decedent's
death in a trial. The empirical evidence offers an additional insight not as
dependent on speculation. Cases alleging more serious injury and cases in
which hospitals are a defendant, pay more often. Death cases fit both
criteria. More than half of the death cases (44 out of 75 death cases or
58.7%) involved hospitals.74
CONCLUSION
We have examined the outcomes of medical malpractice cases on the
basis of a number of different factors other than assessment on the mer-
its. It should come as no surprise that the most successful plaintiffs' attor-
neys are the ones with the greatest amount of relevant experience. It
should come as some comfort to lawyers that attorney qualifications do
seem to matter. There is a value to being skilled. In contrast, it may come
as little comfort to defendants to realize that factors other than the merits
affect outcomes.
Who the plaintiffs' attorney is does matter. The effectiveness of plain-
tiffs' attorneys can be measured in a systematic, empirical way. We need
not rely on inference and anecdote alone. The system, from the perspec-
tive of the plaintiffs' lawyer, works in a rational way. Less seasoned attor-
neys pay a price for their lack of experience. More seasoned attorneys
can expect to enjoy the rewards that come from their greater experience.
74. Table 8. p<0.001.
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